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INTRODUCTION 
Recent controversies in campaign finance have generated concerns that 
wealthy donors will dominate the political landscape, with Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission1 and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission2 
standing as the high-water marks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudential 
turn towards deregulation. This short Essay puts this case law in perspective 
by briefly explaining how our system of federalism gives the states more 
authority than Congress to restrict campaign spending. 
Unlike the federal government, with its system of checks, balances, and 
“veto gates” that make it difficult to enact legislation, states have a more 
compelling interest in countering the appearance of corruption and 
accounting for the distorting influence that money can have in skewing public 
debate over policies. Because of direct democracy, in particular, these policies 
are easier to enact than federal law and therefore are more susceptible to being 
co-opted by special interests.3 While this Essay takes no position on the 
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1 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
2 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
3 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1549 (1990) 
(arguing that direct democracy can be harmful to the interests of racial minority groups because it 
lacks the “internal safeguards designed to filter out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and 
self-interest”). The proliferation of anonymous money would further undermine the ability of direct 
democracy to represent the interests of a fair cross-section of the community. See Michael S. Kang, 
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure 
Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1183 (2003) (arguing that effective campaign finance regulation in the 
context of direct democracy has to “encourage those interested groups to speak directly to the public 
and make identifiable their position on the ballot measure”). 
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wisdom of direct democracy, it argues that the Court can help ensure that  
the states’ constitutionally sanctioned choice of direct democracy actually 
effectuates the preferences of the majority of the electorate by broadening the 
case law’s current conception of anticorruption and resuscitating the recently 
deceased antidistortion rationale. In limiting the states’ ability to defend their 
campaign finance regimes, the Court has not considered that these 
justifications safeguard the political equality that is vital to the success of 
direct democracy systems. Thus, defenders of state campaign finance 
regulations may find greater success by arguing that states have an additional 
and powerful compelling interest in regulating campaign spending because of its 
impact on direct democracy. 
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN A PERIOD OF DEREGULATION:  
RECENT CASE LAW 
In the area of campaign finance, the Supreme Court employs a pluralist 
view of democracy, routinely restricting government power in order to 
encourage its own version of “broad” and “diverse” political participation. 
The Court’s focus on speaker diversity belies its singular focus on 
encouraging speech from two particular constituencies: corporations and 
wealthy individuals.4 For example, Citizens United invalidated a federal law 
prohibiting corporations from making independent expenditures in 
campaigns for public office.5 The Court argued that the ban limited voter 
information and undermined corporate speech rights.6 Similarly, McCutcheon 
invalidated aggregate contribution limits to national party and federal 
candidate committees, reasoning that Congress could not regulate 
contributions “to reduce the amount of money in politics” or “to restrict the 
political participation of some in order to enhance the influence of others.”7 
As a practical matter, however, both decisions undermined government 
efforts to prevent the wealthy from having a louder voice in the political 
system than ordinary voters.8 
 
4 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his opinion in McConnell v. FEC, “We are governed by 
Congress, and this legislation [BCRA] prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those 
entities most capable of giving such criticism loud voice: national political parties and corporations, 
both of the commercial and the not-for-profit sort.” 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
5 558 U.S. at 372. 
6 See, e.g., id. at 349 (“Political speech is indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and 
this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.”). 
7 134 S. Ct. at 1441. 
8 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (noting that “[t]he First Amendment protects speech and 
speaker”); see also Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 165, 165-66 (2015) (describing the expansion of protections for commercial speech against regulation). 
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The answer to our campaign finance woes might lie in using the 
constitutional amendment process of Article V to overturn these decisions, 
or employing Article II to appoint judges sympathetic to campaign finance 
regulation, but there is a much more practical answer to this problem. 
Focusing on how federalism influences the constitutionality of campaign 
finance reform helps to create a jurisprudence that is grounded in both theory 
and reality. Unlike the federal government, which the Framers wanted to 
insulate from the excesses of democracy,9 the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment give states the discretion to govern and run their elections in 
any manner they choose, so long as their political system exceeds the floor of 
republicanism.10 Consequently, most states have opted for political systems 
that are closer to pure democracy,11 which has significant implications for the 
constitutionality of state campaign finance laws. 
II.  THE STATES AS “LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY”:  
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
In many states, voters have significant control over the election of state 
officials and the direction of state policy.12 In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Supreme 
Court touted this as one of the benefits of our federalist system.13 In so doing, 
the Court held that a popularly-enacted Missouri law instituting mandatory 
retirement for state court judges did not violate the federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.14 The Court stressed the respect owed 
to decisions made by states in areas traditionally left to their discretion, even 
if their decisions departed from federal law.15 
 
9 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James 
Madison or Alexander Hamilton). 
10 Under the Guarantee Clause, Congress must guarantee to each state “a republican form of 
government.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Under the Tenth Amendment, states retain control over 
their own elections. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (“[T]he Framers of the 
Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves . . . the power to regulate elections.”); see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause “could be 
no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by a majority of the people in a legal and 
peaceable mode”). 
11 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE 120 (2012) (noting that all states “incorporate the possibility of direct democracy into 
their constitutional orders”). 
12 See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 3 (2006) 
(“[S]tate constitution makers have adopted a number of mechanisms that allow citizens to 
participate directly in the lawmaking process.”). 
13 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that states offer an increased “opportunity for citizen 
involvement in democratic processes” and “more innovation and experimentation in government”). 
14 Id. at 473. 
15 See id. at 461 (“States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, 
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”). 
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Like the Missouri law at issue in Gregory, ballot initiatives and 
referendums illustrate how states have experimented with democratic forms 
of governance over the past two centuries to address what they viewed as 
defects in representative government. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
many states had mandatory referenda on issues such as voting rights and 
apportionment, and they adopted popular initiative procedures in order to 
counteract the power that corporations and railroads had in the legislative sphere.16 
In modern times, ballot initiatives have played a powerful role in 
mitigating the effects of partisanship on government. For example, in 2010, 
Florida voters used direct democracy to prohibit the legislature from taking 
partisanship into account in the drawing of legislative district lines.17 
Similarly, Arizona voters passed a ballot initiative delegating the state 
legislature’s redistricting authority to an independent commission.18 Because 
states rely on direct democracy to enact policy and resolve important political 
issues, immense amounts of money can skew public debate and be especially 
harmful to the political power of ordinary voters.19 
III.  PROMOTING CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT:  
FEDERALISM AS A CONSTRAINT ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, the Supreme Court relied 
on Citizens United to overturn Montana’s one-hundred-year-old ban on 
corporate spending on First Amendment grounds.20 The Court failed to 
consider whether principles of federalism might require a different outcome, 
despite routinely employing federalism arguments to protect the states’ 
governing authority in other areas.21 The Court failed to apply a more lenient 
standard of review to Montana’s ban on corporate independent expenditures, 
 
16 DINAN, supra note 12, at 67-73. 
17 See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 21 (“No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the 
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent . . . .”). 
18 For a brief discussion of this initiative, see Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2661-63 (2015). 
19 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “the special status of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts 
of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very 
heart of our democracy, the electoral process”). 
20 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam). 
21 See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (upholding a state law 
that allowed individuals to exercise free speech on private property on the grounds that a state may 
“adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the 
Federal Constitution”); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (holding that 
Congress cannot commandeer state officials to implement federal law); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (requiring a plain statement that Congress intended to subject states to federal 
law in an area traditionally left to the states). 
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which was a legitimate means of protecting its democratic government from 
wealthy oligarchs. 
Notably, Montana voters enacted the ban at a time when there was 
extensive evidence of electoral corruption in the state as a result of disputes 
between mining and industrial enterprises—both of which were controlled 
by wealthy individuals and corporations.22 As the Montana Supreme Court 
observed, these disputes had “profound long-term impacts on the entire 
State, including issues regarding the judiciary, the location of the state 
capitol, the procedure for election of U.S. Senators, and the ownership and 
control of virtually all media outlets in the State.”23 
The Court has not always ignored the corrupting and potentially 
distorting impact of money on the political process. In Austin v. Michigan 
State Chamber of Commerce, the Court sustained restrictions on independent 
expenditures by corporations and unions, reasoning that the First 
Amendment could not supplant the overwhelming interest that the 
government has in preventing well-financed special interests from distorting 
an issue’s level of support among the general electorate (also known as the 
“antidistortion” rationale).24 Similarly, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC upheld contribution limits for state elections, despite scant evidence of 
actual corruption, because the appearance of corruption could undermine the 
people’s faith in the political system.25 
Although the Court has either rejected outright or severely circumscribed 
these rationales in recent cases, these justifications are implicated when states, 
like Montana, delegate significant governing authority to their citizens via 
direct democracy. While the federal legislative process has a series of “veto 
gates” that make it difficult for special interests to enact their preferred 
legislation despite the proliferation of money in federal elections, the filter of 
representative government is not present to mitigate the outsized influence 
of the wealthy in systems of direct democracy.26 Thus, the Court’s approach 
in its recent cases—let everyone in, let everyone spend—stands in tension 
with the truly pluralistic and inclusive systems that states are seeking to 
implement through direct democracy. 
 
22 See Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2491-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case at bar 
presented stronger evidence of corruption than Citizens United). 
23 W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 2011 MT 328, ¶ 22, 363 Mont. 220, 271 P.3d 1, 8. 
24 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
25 528 U.S. 377, 390-95 (2000). 
26 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-)Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 311, 336 (2012) 
(describing veto gates as “junctures [that] make it easier to block than to pass legislation because 
success at every focal point is required for passage”). 
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CONCLUSION 
 States have the freedom to embrace democracy, reject democracy in favor 
of representative government, or choose any form of government that 
comports with the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment. The Court 
must therefore allow states to regulate campaign finance in a manner that is 
consistent with—and protective of—their chosen form of government by 
allowing states to advance an antidistortion rationale or a broader 
anticorruption justification in defending their campaign finance laws. For 
those states that rely on direct democracy as part of their preferred governing 
model, the Constitution permits limitations on the influence of the wealthy 
in order to further the democratic nature of state political systems.  
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